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CEPLER WORKING PAPER 
Jean McHale and Atina Krajewska 
 
 
REIMAGINING HEALTH LAW 
 
 
On the 11th September 2018 a Reimagining Health Law Workshop took place at 
the Birmingham Law School. The Workshop aimed to explore the discipline of 
health law from a range of perspectives: doctrinal/historical/critical. Health law 
is a relatively young discipline, which has emerged from a backdrop of “Medical” 
and “Health Care “ law and has developed rapidly in recent decades. The purpose 
of the meeting was to consider the disciplinary interface within and outside law, 
i.e. health law’s connection to other legal fields, its relationship with bioethics, 
humanities, and social sciences, and their impact on the health law methodology. 
In particular the speakers addressed a number of pressing questions that have 
influenced the field in the past and will shape it in future.  
 
The main questions that we set ourselves to answer were as follows: What do we 
mean when we write about, research on, or teach Health Law? Is there a unique 
health law method and if so, to what extent have the developments in other 
fields and disciplines contributed to the emergence of that method? To what 
extent is the fact that an academic scholar began as a public lawyer, which led to 
them working in health law, impacts on the way in which the discipline itself is 
framed? Are we witnessing any important paradigm shift in the field at the 
moment? We wanted to encourage the participants to reflect on different ideas 
and synergies framing health law and to question assumptions about what 
health law- was, is, and where it is going. 
 
The Workshop was organised by Professor Jean McHale, the Director of the 
Centre for Health Law, Science, and Policy (CHLSP), and Dr Atina Krajewska, 
Senior Birmingham Fellow at the Birmingham Law School. It was jointly funded 
by CEPLER, the Birmingham Law School and CHLSP. Around 40 academic 
scholars, students, medics, and publishers’ reps joined us for the day. Among 
them were the pioneers of medical law and bioethics who developed the 
discipline in the 1980s, prominent health lawyers of the day, and young 
researchers who will shape the field in the future.    
 
The event was divided into four sessions: 
SESSION ONE: HEALTH AND LAW- HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
SESSION TWO: DIFFERENT LENSES OF HEALTH LAW  
SESSION THREE: ACTORS, PRINCIPLES, METHODS  
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SESSION FOUR: “OUT WITH THE OLD AND IN WITH THE NEW”: A LENSE OF 
HOPE?  
 
SESSION ONE: HEALTH AND LAW- HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
In the first session, chaired by Professor Bob Lee, we took a closer look at the 
historic development of health law, the formation of medical law at the 
intersection of tort law, criminal law, and bioethics. We were fortunate to have 
with us (via video-link) Professor Margot Brazier from the University of 
Manchester, Professor Jonathan Montgomery from UCL, and  (in person) 
Professor Phil Fennell from Cardiff University, all setting the trends in different 
areas of health law, both at the beginnings of its journey and today.  
 
Margot Brazier (University of Manchester), in her talk entitled  “Early Years of 
Health Law - An Accidental Journey?” talked about her experiences as a lecturer 
when medical law was at its infancy and the challenges that her and her 
colleagues, Sheila Maclean, David Price, Derek Morgan, and Ian Kennedy, faced 
when they attempted to establish medical law as a separate discipline. She 
started as follows:  
“In universities across the United Kingdom in the last 15 years or so of the 20th 
century a ‘new’ area of academic research and teaching took flight – what most 
people then called medical law? In 1980 you would have struggled to find a 
course in medical law or more than the odd individual scholar researching the 
topic. In 2018, you would find courses in most LLB programmes, Masters 
Courses, PhD students and several research centres dedicated to what many now 
name health law. In many such centres health law contracted a marriage with 
what was once called medical ethics and now termed bioethics. How did this 
come about? What were the aims of this new breed of scholars? Who approved 
the developments? How did the scholars establish their competencies? Maybe 
they did none of these things and simply embarked on an accidental journey?”  
 
In responding to these questions she highlighted the fact that the emergence of 
medical law coincided with the emergence of law and economics, environmental 
law, law and criminal justice and other sub disciplines. “We need to ensure that 
we perceive the development of medical law in the context of its times and that 
our future may depend as much on the direction of travel of law school overall as 
your own effort.” She went on to discuss the evolution from medical law to 
health law and the limitations of every definition. While the intersections with 
other disciplines, including bioethics and medical history are crucial, health law 
has still a lot to offer in the fast changing world of medicine and science.  
  
Jonathan Montgomery (University College London) continued to discuss the 
problem of labels and definitions raised by Margot in her talk. In his presentation 
entitled “What’s in a name? The effects of labelling on our analysis of the role of 
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law in health” he considered some of the labels that have been used by scholars 
to define and theorise our subject area such as medicine law and ethics, medical 
law and ethics, public health care law, or global health law. He noted that “labels 
are the currency of power struggles, and we should excavate the aims and 
objectives that are served by their instrumental use in projects (descriptive and 
normative). They also act as cultural icons in socio-political-historical contexts. 
They point us to connections, social meanings and enable us to engage in shared 
conversations. They have important framing effects, making some things easier 
to see and obscure others, suggesting different questions for primary 
consideration, making some solutions more apparent than others. This can be 
seen in the contents of textbooks, the search for underlying unities, and the sense 
of purpose of scholars. He identified boundary cases for content; medicines, the 
right to die, capacity law as important for re-imagining the subject. Abortion was 
used to test underlying unities (ethics, rights to care, provider regulation, safety). 
In Jonathan’s view interpretations of the House of Lords decision in Gillick and 
the Supreme Court decision in Montgomery show different senses of purpose 
among scholars. 
 
Phil Fennell (Cardiff University) focused on the journey of mental health law and 
health and social care law in his talk entitled “Codifying Clinical Power: The 
Juridification of Health and Social Care”. Recalling his experiences as a scholar 
and human rights advocate over the past 40 years. He reflected on the 
development of a key area of medical law during this period of academic 
development, namely the dramatic expansion and codification of various 
interwoven and overlapping regimes of statutory and common law powers to 
detain people with mental disabilities and treat them without consent. Phil 
considered these developments in the light of 21st Century human rights 
discourse. In relation to disability rights it has become customary to refer to old 
and new paradigm human rights. The old human rights paradigm acknowledges 
the legitimacy of tutelary relations, accepting the power of the state to detain and 
treat people with mental disabilities for paternalist reasons or for public 
protection, but insisting on restrictions on medical decision-making affecting the 
right to liberty, the right to be free from torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment, and the right to physical and psychological integrity. The new 
paradigm seeks to prohibit all such interventions as manifestations of disability 
discrimination and social exclusion. The development of health and social care 
law over the past 40 years in terms of balancing expansion of clinical power 
against human rights protections for mentally disabled people and their families 
and carers were considered in the light of these two human rights paradigms. 
According to Phil Fennel it is the area of mental health and social care law where 
the most exciting innovations and battles are taking place. They should be very 
carefully analysed by health and human rights lawyers in the UK. 
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SESSION TWO: DIFFERENT LENSES OF HEALTH LAW  
 
Katherine Wade from the University of Leicester chaired the second morning 
session, which focused on the different legal lenses through which health law can 
be viewed, analysed and developed. 
 
Keith Syrett (University of Bristol) spoke about "Health Law through a Public 
Law lens". In his view the traditional focus of medical law upon the physician-
patient relationship has tended to disguise both that healthcare is delivered 
within a systemic context, and that it performs collective functions. Public law 
provides a means of comprehending, analysing and evaluating the relevant 
organisational environment and societal goals and ought therefore to be 
considered as foundational to the teaching and research of health law. His talk 
sought to explicate this perspective, and its value for health lawyers, in more 
detail.  
 
Jean McHale (University of Birmingham) on the other hand presented a detailed 
and critical analysis of “Health Law as a subset of Human Rights law. Really?” She 
started her presentation by recalling the third edition of their textbook Medical 
Law in 2000, in which Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb commented that medical 
law had one unifying theme – that of human rights. This well- known statement 
was itself preceded by Ian Kennedy’s assertions that medical law could be seen 
as a subset of human rights law just over a decade earlier 1988 in his book Treat 
Me Right: Essays in Medical Law and Ethics. While on first glance there does 
seem to be a clear synergy between health law and human rights law this paper 
interrogates whether health law can really be said to be a subset of human rights 
law empirically and/or normatively. Jean began by examining what led Kennedy 
to make his original assertions and whether his original arguments were 
justifiable. She went on to analyse  the legal developments in the UK over the last 
thirty years in the health law area including those since the Human Rights Act 
2000 and doubted whether the original premises are met today. Her paper 
outlined a new intellectual project, which aims to unpack some of the different 
stories presented by engagement with human rights principles since October 
2000 and the diverse responses they present.  
 
SESSION THREE: ACTORS, PRINCIPLES, METHODS 
The third session focused on the subjects and principles that constitute the 
discipline of health law. The session demonstrated the wealth of the theoretical 
accounts and conceptualisations of subjectivity in health law and how these 
shape the discipline. It paid particular attention to the recent landmark case of 
Montgomery (2015), which shifted the paradigm in the area of informed consent 
and redefined the way we view patient-doctor relationship.  
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It begun with the presentation by Marie Fox (University of Liverpool) 
“Embodying Health Law - who are the subjects of health law?”. Her paper 
explored the contribution that new materialist and posthumanist approaches, 
which emphasise bodily processes and corporeal capacities, can make to re-
imaging the contours of the legal subject. It takes up questions about the nature 
of matter and bodies, and the place of embodied humans within the ambit of 
health law. New ways of life and living can serve to complicate conventional 
ethical concepts such as personhood; while a shift in focus from ‘the body’ to 
embodiment as the object of analysis directs attention to forms of matter and 
embodied choices which are valued and validated by law. By dislocating agency 
as the property of a discrete self-knowing subject - whether the agency of 
patients or doctors (the traditional subjects of ‘medical’ law) - such approaches, 
in turn, allow health lawyers to resist representations of the legal subject as 
universal and disembodied. Additionally, as Marie pointed out, they call into 
question the various dichotomies and oppositions (such as mind/body, 
human/animal) that have traditionally structured law’s understanding of its 
subjects, and bring into play new forms of vulnerable, precarious or cyborgian 
subjects, and the question of how they are produced and governed by the state 
and other bodies.  
 
Emma Cave and Nina Reinach (Durham University) in their talk on “Patient-
centred care now and then” discussed the developments in the law on informed 
consent and the impact that’s had on the relationship between medicine, patients 
and the law. Exploring the rights-based approach in Montgomery, they 
contrasted the right to choose with rights to be consulted and to ‘know’. With the 
aid of an historical vignette, and a personal story of family history that sets out a 
dilemma regarding the flow of information from doctor to patient, they 
considered how much has really changed and concluded that more change 
needed. They set out the principle of trust as paramount for any such future 
change. 
 
Sylvie Delacroix (University of Birmingham) in her talk “At a cross-roads? The 
courts’ shifting apprehension of the vulnerability at stake in the healthcare 
relationship.”  Sylvie took the case of Montgomery as a starting point for a 
theoretical analysis of the doctor-patient relationships. In the domain of 
healthcare, the focus on the epistemic vulnerability that characterises doctor-
patient relationships has had the unfortunate effect of allowing questions 
relating to the appropriate disclosure of information (about known risks and 
side-effects) to occupy a lot of the conceptual space when it comes to articulating 
standards by reference to which medical judgment may lend itself to judicial 
oversight. This focus on information disclosure has in turn insidiously 
contributed to levelling down the qualitative difference between the 
responsibility of healthcare providers on the one hand and that of all expert 
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services providers on the other. The rationale for the disclosure of known risks 
and side-effects of medical intervention is indeed to address the knowledge 
asymmetry that characterises most doctor-patient relationships and to 
(supposedly) empower patients to make informed choices. Presented like this, 
the challenge at stake does not differ in any way from that which characterises 
the lay-expert relationship in a wide range of applications. Yet most people will 
have the intuition that there is an important difference between the choices that 
a healthcare provider is meant to empower and those at stake in a mountain 
expedition. The problem is that the courts’ overwhelming focus on information 
disclosure has obscured what mere disclosure cannot achieve: empowering 
patients to retain some active involvement -and hence a sense of authorship- in 
the decision-making processes that are likely to shape their sense of self for 
some time to come. The latter empowerment aim may sound overly ambitious. I 
argue that it is no more so than a commitment to retain a meaningful, practice- 
relevant concept of professional responsibility. A shift away from mere epistemic 
vulnerability has the potential to contribute substantial changes to both the 
conceptualisation and the provision of healthcare in practice.  
 
The session was concluded by a talk by Jose Miola (University of Leicester): who 
critically asked: “Patient Facing Medical Law: So Why Aren’t I Happy?” Having 
previously argued for greater judicial recognition and engagement with the 
ethical issues in medical law, and a greater focus on the rights of patients instead 
of the duties of doctors, medical law seems to have delivered what  Josehad 
hoped, particularly in the decision in Montgomery. Nevertheless, in his 
presentation he undertook a critical analysis of this decision and identified its 
shortcomings. He argued that the law has simply replaced one set of problems 
for another, that perhaps counterintuitively equally fails to protect patients and 
their interests. He also argued that we must now begin to subject judges to the 
same scrutiny that we used to impose on doctors.  
 
SESSION FOUR: “OUT WITH THE OLD AND IN WITH THE NEW”: A LENSE OF 
HOPE?  
 
The final session of the day, chaired by Citta Widago from the University of 
Birmingham, was probably the most eclectic of the day in terms of topics and 
methodologies covered by the speakers. It demonstrated the wide range of 
scholarly and disciplinary approaches associated health law and the diversity of 
possible avenues of its future development. 
 
Richard Ashcroft (Queen Mary London): “The Utopian Functions of Health Law”  
 
Richard explored health law through the lens of the Utopian vision set out in St 
Thomas Moore’s book. He began by critiquing the approach taken to the 
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interface between law and personhood taken in the recent work of Foster and 
Herring (2017). He explored the satirical attempt made by Moore to outline a 
utopian vision and the implications for health law.  Law and humanity can live in 
ordered set of laws. Would Health law produce an ideally ordered community? 
He provided examples, so for instance, the concept of informed consent projects 
the ideal doctor-patient relationship. It could be productive or indeed rhetorical 
in terms of conversation. He examined the implications as to whether human 
rights would be a better way to order things today. 
 
 
Nicky Priaulx’s presentation on “Glass Walls: The Relevancy of States and 
Strategies of Ignorance to the Future of Healthcare Law” argued for the 
centralisation of the ‘unknown’ within contemporary healthcare law. This is not 
a significant leap. Epistemological questions have long sat at the heart of legal 
studies, and increasingly such questions are woven into the fabric of healthcare 
law scholarship. A voluminous literature highlights the many epistemic fault 
lines running through the law: between law-in-the-books and law-in-action, 
embedded within legal concepts and standards, and the stories about human life 
that result. Nevertheless, what is unknown takes on a ‘deviant’ state, where the 
aim is to close gaps, capture the “real world”, to render unknowns knowable to 
us as scholars, judges, legislators, patients and clinicians. While important, this 
presentation advocates a slight tilt in focus; moving away from ignorance as 
deviant, in favour of exploring its normality and regularity (Gross and McGoey, 
2015). Illustrating how much of what is known is ‘tacit’, and how routinely we 
confront ‘glass walls’ of knowledge, she encouraged a direct confrontation with 
‘the limits of knowing’ (Barnett, 2004). The aim was to open up quite different 
questions about the unknown, as well as to bring more clearly into view the 
strategies, structures, behaviours and methodologies of ignorance that populate 
our field.  
 
Atina Krajewska was the last speaker of the day with her talk on “Health Law as a 
‘magic wand of visibility’?”. In her talk she aimed to bring the sociological 
accounts of healthcare and law in the forefront of discussions and view the 
developments in health law through a functionalist and systems-theoretical lens. 
She suggest that - if reinterpreted and developed – they offer original insights 
and provide a very useful point of reference for creating systematic 
conceptualisations of health law in future. Theoretical debates about the nature 
and functions of health law often revolve around the idea temporal dislocation 
between health law and medical sciences. Health law is often perceived as a field 
that remains behind technological innovation, always trying, and inevitably 
failing, to keep up with advances in science. It is also often criticised for falling 
behind socio-political changes that render it inadequate, incoherent, or out-of-
date. Much of this critique is undoubtedly warranted and necessary. However, 
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this paper aims to propose a different view of health law and analyse instances, 
in which it can release its jurisgenerative potential. Taking the controversial 
example of reproductive rights she argued that health law can be seen as a 
normative system that sheds light onto, often invisible (and almost always 
vulnerable), subjects allowing them to acquire visibility and subjectivity through 
the legal process. Focusing on the process of legal visibilisation, she 
demonstrated how health law in some instances has the ability to become means 
of resistance, mobilisation and citizenship formation. Consequently, she argued 
for the more discussions about the creative function of health law and its 
limitations as an important avenue of academic inquiry in future.  
 
The response to the event and the discussions has been extremely positive. Many 
participants expressed their appreciation for the topic of the Workshop and said 
that discussions about the nature of medical, health law, and social care law were 
long overdue. Health law seems to be a discipline, which lends itself to 
theoretical debates and the development of philosophical and ethical concepts. 
Nevertheless, it remains very practical and has not fully engaged in self-
reflection at a meta-level. A turn towards methodologies seems to be much 
needed and this is why the Workshop has been greatly appreciated. We could 
even say that it marked  a form of “coming of age” point for health law as a 
discipline. 
 
The success of the event and the need for further discussions was further 
reflected in the fact that we have been invited to prepare a special post-
conference issue for The Journal of Medical Law and Ethics, which is going to be 
published in Summer 2019. In addition, Edgar Elgar expressed their interest in 
pursuing a book project concerning the theme of our Workshop. As a result, 
plans for an edited collection entitled Reimagining Health Law are currently 
being developed. The collection aims to define the disciplinary boundaries and 
methodological approaches to Health Law and its future trajectories. The 
Workshop revealed great appetites for academic inquiry in this area and we are 
pleased we could begin the discussion and contribute to it at an early stage. 
 
